71 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
71 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Issue implementation plan - 2026-10-26
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Repository: https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge
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Six issues (#2-#7) remain open. Their initial fixes were merged into `main`
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in [PR #8](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/pulls/8), with release notes
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in v3.50. Acceptance and remaining rule compliance work continue sequentially
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on `fix/issue-acceptance-and-migration-safety`.
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| Order | Issue | Implementation and acceptance | Status |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| 1 | [#2](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/2) | Block foreign Host/Origin/Referer and cross-site browser requests in both routers; validate API body types; refuse saved-password reuse for a changed host/port/user. Middleware and real setup/runtime router tests reject attacks without changing saved credentials or user data. | Acceptance passed |
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| 2 | [#4](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/4) | Move LOT-bearing cart/rental events to delegated listeners and escaped data attributes; escape BOM and sync output; share HTML escaping; render toast as text. Malicious LOT regression checks and headless Chrome DOM checks pass. | Acceptance passed |
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| 3 | [#7](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/7) | Require a fresh verified archive outside rotation before reset, refuse unsynced/legacy states without explicit force, use transactional deletion, remove environment-triggered reset. Verify refusal, ZIP restore, backup failure and rollback. | Implemented |
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| 4 | [#5](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/5) | Persist TLS mode/CA in SQLite, expose setup controls, share policy across setup/sync/migration DSNs. Verify certificate trust, hostname checks, plaintext fallback policy and settings round-trip. | Implemented |
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| 5 | [#3](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/3) | Keep each migration file in one session, execute verify headers before history insertion, propagate FK failures. Verify failed queries/checks never enter history. | Implemented |
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| 6 | [#6](https://git.mchus.pro/mchus/QuoteForge/issues/6) | Require Go 1.27.3, update vulnerable dependencies, block release on pinned govulncheck. Full tests, vet, security scan and macOS/Windows builds must pass. | Implemented |
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## Decisions
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- HTTP forms remain supported on setup and multipart vendor import; JSON APIs
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reject non-JSON bodies. CLI clients may omit browser origin headers.
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- CSP without inline scripts remains outside this patch; the issue lists it as optional.
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- Forced reset still requires a verified backup. `QFS_RESET_LOCAL_DB` is ignored,
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with a startup warning; only explicit CLI flags can initiate reset.
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- TLS defaults to `preferred` for existing-server compatibility, as requested in
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the issue. It permits plaintext fallback; use `verify-full` for authenticated
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encryption. The setup form explains this distinction.
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- `go 1.27.3` enforces the minimum compiler, including with `GOTOOLCHAIN=local`.
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A redundant `toolchain go1.27.3` is removed by Go tooling and is unnecessary.
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- The local ignored `.claude/skills/release/SKILL.md` was updated with the security
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prerequisite; the shared Makefile and release script enforce it in git.
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## Validation and handoff
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Passed: `go test ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `node scripts/tests/html-security.cjs`,
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`make security-check`, shell syntax and diff checks, and CGO-free builds for
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macOS arm64 and Windows amd64.
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Govulncheck reports zero reachable vulnerabilities and one module-level advisory
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whose affected code is not called. Gin's transitive quic-go was explicitly raised
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to v0.59.1 after the first scan identified a reachable advisory in v0.59.0.
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The checks use temporary SQLite databases and synthetic certificates. They do
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not exercise a live MariaDB server or browser automation. The original implementation PR is merged. Remaining acceptance work and
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rule compliance are tracked below; issue state changes are separate.
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## Acceptance follow-up
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### Issue #2
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`go test ./cmd/qfs -run TestRequestBoundaryOnApplicationRouters -count=1`
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exercises the production setup and runtime route constructors with temporary
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SQLite state. Foreign setup forms, opaque origins and rebinding hosts are
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rejected, text/plain JSON receives 415, and both setup handlers reject saved
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password reuse for a changed destination. Local reads still succeed. Saved
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credentials, project/configuration counts and the pending queue remain unchanged.
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The setup router construction was extracted without changing its routes so
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this regression exercises the same middleware registration as startup.
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### Issue #4
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`node scripts/tests/html-security-browser.cjs` passes in headless Chrome with
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an isolated temporary profile. It executes the actual template rendering
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functions in a browser DOM with controlled API responses. Both cart layouts,
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rental, parsed BOM, toast, pending sync errors, error history and repair errors
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preserve malicious strings as text. Real click/change/focus events preserve
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LOT values through delegated handlers; no injected elements or payload execution
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are observed. This is a rendering integration check, not a full application
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navigation test. Set `CHROME_BIN` outside macOS to select a Chrome executable.
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