Cross-checked internal/privacy against the batch companion-app report over project/rma. Fixes for the dominant false-positive classes: - Real-TLD gate (tld.go): FQDN/e-mail must end in a curated TLD or a pseudo-TLD with a >=3-char label; two-letter file/code suffixes (.sh .so .md .id .service ...) are a hard denylist. Kills "0.linux" (45996 hits), "mountall.sh", "libc.so", "@odata.id", "serial-getty@ttyAMA0.service". - Clean-token boundary + Title-case reject: "auth.backend.gssapi.store-creds", "OS.It" are code, not hosts. - Kernel ring-buffer ("[ 8.07][ T1] ...") and Go stack-trace lines skipped. - resolv domain/search values must contain a dot ("domain 53" -> out). - IPv4: skip comment lines, version/spec lines (X.Org, IEEE Std, l0fw_ver), "0."/"1."/".0" quads; allowlist Yandex resolvers + RFC3849 2001:db8::/32. - fru_location: drop all-digit / serial-like / field-name-echo values. - Drop the hostname rule (zero real hits, only "bmc-state-manager" noise). - domain category: high -> low, medium at 3+ labels. Real customer signal now comes from resolv/nsupdate/ad_ldap/mgmt, which the corpus confirms catches every actual customer (netwell.local, tcsbank.ru). - Allowlist smartmontools.org, openib.org, apache.org, freebsd.org, golang.org, ipxe.org, nvidia.com and other FOSS/vendor infra; skip LOGPile's own raw_export.json / parser_fields.json / collect.log members. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
62 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
package privacy
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import "net"
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// Documentation, benchmarking, and well-known example addresses that carry no
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// site information even though they are globally routable.
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var nonSensitiveNets = func() []*net.IPNet {
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cidrs := []string{
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"192.0.2.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1
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"198.51.100.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-2
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"203.0.113.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-3
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"198.18.0.0/15", // RFC 2544 benchmarking
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"100.64.0.0/10", // RFC 6598 CGNAT
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"192.88.99.0/24", // RFC 7526 6to4 relay anycast
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"2001:db8::/32", // RFC 3849 documentation
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}
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out := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(cidrs))
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for _, c := range cidrs {
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if _, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(c); err == nil {
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out = append(out, n)
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}
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}
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return out
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}()
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var nonSensitiveExact = map[string]struct{}{
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"8.8.8.8": {}, "8.8.4.4": {}, "1.1.1.1": {}, "1.0.0.1": {},
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"4.2.2.2": {}, "4.2.2.1": {}, "9.9.9.9": {}, "1.2.3.4": {}, "2.4.6.8": {},
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"208.67.222.222": {}, "208.67.220.220": {},
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"77.88.8.8": {}, "77.88.8.1": {}, "77.88.8.88": {}, // Yandex public DNS
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}
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// isSensitiveIP reports whether s is a routable address that could identify the
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// customer's provider or site. Private (RFC1918/ULA), loopback, link-local,
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// multicast, and the example/benchmark ranges above are not sensitive.
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func isSensitiveIP(s string) bool {
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ip := net.ParseIP(s)
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if ip == nil {
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return false
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}
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if _, ok := nonSensitiveExact[s]; ok {
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return false
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}
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if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsUnspecified() ||
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ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
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ip.IsMulticast() || ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() {
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return false
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}
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if !ip.IsGlobalUnicast() {
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return false
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}
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if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil && (v4[0] == 0 || v4[0] == 255 || v4[0] >= 240) {
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return false
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}
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for _, n := range nonSensitiveNets {
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if n.Contains(ip) {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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