Scan now reports PrivacyScan.Sanitized {detected, markers, strong, files,
evidence}. SanitizationMarkers recognises a value slot filled with one
repeated placeholder + separators (xxxxx.xxxx.xx, x@xxxx.xxxx.xx,
000.00.00.0, a decoy timezone) - it matches the shape, not the literal "x",
so evolving the redaction mechanism still trips it.
detected requires corroboration: strong>=2, or strong>=1 && markers>=3, or
markers>=4. A single filler-looking token is reported (markers:1) but never
asserted as sanitized, so a partial future pass or a coincidence does not
read as "done". 0.0.0.0 / 000 / UTC / Etc/UTC are too plausibly intentional
and do not count.
UI: the Customer-data panel shows "файл уже обезличен" and hides the
sanitize button when detected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014jDYM1nnoZZ3vFz23DDaV1
Adds internal/sanitize: rewrites the customer-identifying spans that
internal/privacy detects (domain/FQDN/e-mail/AD/public-IP/timezone) with
same-length neutral fillers, in place, without changing the file format.
- Fillers keep byte length: "sigma.sbrf.ru" -> "xxxxx.xxxx.xx", IP ->
"00.000.000.00", "Europe/Moscow" -> "Etc/Universal" (same-length valid
neutral IANA zone), offset "180" -> "000". Timestamps are not recomputed.
- Lossless recursive archive walk (tar/.sds/gz/tgz/zip): entry names, modes,
and all embedded timestamps preserved; untouched zip entries copied raw;
member payload length unchanged so tar headers stay byte-identical; only the
.gz/.zip compression layer is rebuilt. 0 redactions -> byte-identical output.
- privacy.FindSpans is the one matcher shared by detection and redaction;
fillers are recognised by isRedactionFiller so a re-scan / second pass is a
no-op. New privacy FPs fixed along the way: syslog selectors (local7.info),
"MEVersion" firmware quads, *.conf_bak vendor templates, bundled viewer
domains.
- Binary members (FRU.bin, localtime, redis-dump.rdb, SOL captures) and
unreadable nested archives are reported in Result.SkippedBinary, never edited.
- Surfaces: POST /api/sanitize (+ GET /api/sanitize/download), the "Обезличить
и скачать копию" button in the Customer-data panel, and
logpile -sanitize <file> (restores mtime/atime).
Verified: re-parsing a sanitized Dell TSR / xFusion / Inspur onekeylog / H3C
.sds yields the identical hardware inventory; re-scan is clean. ADL-067,
bible-local/docs/log-sanitization.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Detection-only scan (internal/privacy) attached to every AnalysisResult:
a customer-domain guess plus a findings list (category, file, line, match,
hint), ported from the KB grep playbook. Runs on archive uploads and the
serialized Redfish tree; gated by LOGPILE_PRIVACY_SCAN (default on).
Surfaced at GET /api/privacy-scan, in the "Customer data" UI panel, and as
privacy_report.json in the raw-export bundle. IP policy keeps RFC1918 and
example ranges out of findings; allowlist covers standards-body and vendor
infrastructure domains. No customer tokens in the repo. See ADL-066 and
bible-local/docs/privacy-scan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add bible.git as submodule at bible/
- Move docs/bible/ → bible-local/ (project-specific architecture)
- Update CLAUDE.md to reference both bible/ and bible-local/
- Add AGENTS.md for Codex with same structure
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mikhail Chusavitin
mchus