feat(sanitize): in-place, length-preserving log de-identification

Adds internal/sanitize: rewrites the customer-identifying spans that
internal/privacy detects (domain/FQDN/e-mail/AD/public-IP/timezone) with
same-length neutral fillers, in place, without changing the file format.

- Fillers keep byte length: "sigma.sbrf.ru" -> "xxxxx.xxxx.xx", IP ->
  "00.000.000.00", "Europe/Moscow" -> "Etc/Universal" (same-length valid
  neutral IANA zone), offset "180" -> "000". Timestamps are not recomputed.
- Lossless recursive archive walk (tar/.sds/gz/tgz/zip): entry names, modes,
  and all embedded timestamps preserved; untouched zip entries copied raw;
  member payload length unchanged so tar headers stay byte-identical; only the
  .gz/.zip compression layer is rebuilt. 0 redactions -> byte-identical output.
- privacy.FindSpans is the one matcher shared by detection and redaction;
  fillers are recognised by isRedactionFiller so a re-scan / second pass is a
  no-op. New privacy FPs fixed along the way: syslog selectors (local7.info),
  "MEVersion" firmware quads, *.conf_bak vendor templates, bundled viewer
  domains.
- Binary members (FRU.bin, localtime, redis-dump.rdb, SOL captures) and
  unreadable nested archives are reported in Result.SkippedBinary, never edited.
- Surfaces: POST /api/sanitize (+ GET /api/sanitize/download), the "Обезличить
  и скачать копию" button in the Customer-data panel, and
  logpile -sanitize <file> (restores mtime/atime).

Verified: re-parsing a sanitized Dell TSR / xFusion / Inspur onekeylog / H3C
.sds yields the identical hardware inventory; re-scan is clean. ADL-067,
bible-local/docs/log-sanitization.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

bible-local/01-overview.md

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ All modes converge on the same normalized hardware model and exporter pipeline.
 - Reanimator export and batch conversion workflows
 - Embedded `pci.ids` lookup for vendor/device name enrichment
 - Customer-data / anonymization scan of ingested sources (detection only; see `docs/privacy-scan.md`)
+- In-place, length-preserving de-identification of an uploaded dump (`docs/log-sanitization.md`)
 
 ## Current vendor coverage
 

bible-local/03-api.md

@@ -159,6 +159,27 @@ Returns the customer-data scan for the current dataset (`models.PrivacyScan`:
 Returns `{ "loaded": false }` when nothing is loaded or the scan produced
 nothing. Detection only; see `docs/privacy-scan.md`.
 
+### `POST /api/sanitize`
+
+Builds a de-identified copy of the current uploaded file (customer-data spans
+replaced with same-length neutral fillers, format and timestamps preserved) and
+returns the change preview:
+
+```json
+{ "filename": "...", "input_size": 0, "output_size": 0,
+  "total_replaced": 0, "changes": [{"path","category","count","sample_before","sample_after"}],
+  "skipped_binary": ["member (binary - sanitize manually)"] }
+```
+
+`422` when the current dataset is not an uploaded file (live Redfish / snapshot)
+or the format cannot be rebuilt. See `docs/log-sanitization.md`.
+
+### `GET /api/sanitize/download`
+
+Streams the file produced by the last `POST /api/sanitize`
+(`Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="<original>"`,
+`Content-Type: application/octet-stream`). `404` if none is ready.
+
 ### `GET /api/parsers`
 
 Returns registered parser metadata.

bible-local/07-exporters.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 | `GET /api/export/reanimator` | JSON | Reanimator hardware payload |
 | `GET /chart/current?print=true` | HTML (auto-print) | Print/PDF version of the report — opens in new tab, calls `window.print()` |
 | `POST /api/convert` | async ZIP artifact | Batch archive-to-Reanimator conversion |
+| `POST /api/sanitize` + `GET /api/sanitize/download` | same-format file | De-identified copy of the upload (`docs/log-sanitization.md`) |
 
 ## Raw export
 

bible-local/08-build-release.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Defined in `cmd/logpile/main.go`:
 |------|---------|---------|
 | `--port` | `8082` | HTTP server port |
 | `--file` | empty | Preload archive file |
+| `--sanitize` | empty | De-identify customer data in this file and exit (`docs/log-sanitization.md`) |
+| `--sanitize-out` | empty | Where `--sanitize` writes its result (default: overwrite the input) |
 | `--version` | `false` | Print version and exit |
 | `--no-browser` | `false` | Do not auto-open browser |
 | `--hold-on-crash` | `true` on Windows | Keep console open after fatal crash |

bible-local/10-decisions.md

@@ -1937,3 +1937,45 @@ token, remediation hint).
   `TestIsAllowlistedDomain`, `TestRegistrableDomain`, `TestGuessCustomers_*`),
   `internal/server` (`TestHandleGetPrivacyScan_*`,
   `TestBuildRawExportBundle_*PrivacyReport*`).
+
+---
+
+## ADL-067 — In-place, length-preserving log sanitization
+
+**Date:** 2026-09-02
+**Context:** ADL-066 detects customer-identifying data but the operator still
+redacts by hand before forwarding a dump. The redaction has to keep the file
+usable and unremarkable: same format, same archive structure, same embedded
+timestamps, no "sanitized by" marker.
+**Decision:** `internal/sanitize` rewrites the spans `internal/privacy` finds
+with **same-length neutral fillers**, in place.
+- Fillers: hostname/e-mail/AD/cert → letters and digits to `x`, punctuation
+  kept (`sigma.sbrf.ru` → `xxxxx.xxxx.xx`); public IP → digits to `0`
+  (`93.184.216.34` → `00.000.000.00`, `net.ParseIP` → nil); timezone name →
+  a same-length valid neutral IANA zone from a curated `len → zone` table
+  (`Europe/Moscow` → `Etc/Universal`); UTC offset → zeros (`180` → `000`).
+  Timestamps are never recomputed.
+- Because member payload length never changes, tar/zip entry headers,
+  checksums, names, modes and mtimes are byte-identical; for `.gz`/`.zip` only
+  the compression layer is rebuilt. Uncompressed `.tar`/`.sds`/plain text with
+  nothing to redact come out byte-for-byte identical.
+- Detection and redaction share one matcher: `privacy.FindSpans`. The fillers
+  are recognised by `isRedactionFiller` so a re-scan / second pass is a no-op.
+- Not edited: binary members (`FRU.bin`, `localtime` tzdata, `redis-dump.rdb`,
+  DER certs), unreadable nested archives — listed in `Result.SkippedBinary`
+  for manual handling. `.gz`/`.zip` cannot be byte-identical (recompression).
+  ctime is not restorable on a CLI in-place edit.
+- Surfaced by `POST /api/sanitize` (+ `GET /api/sanitize/download`), the
+  "Обезличить и скачать копию" button in the Customer-data panel, and
+  `logpile -sanitize <file>` (restores mtime/atime via `os.Chtimes`).
+**Consequences:**
+- Only formats the walker can rebuild losslessly are offered
+  (`sanitize.CanSanitize`): `.tar .sds .gz .tgz .zip .txt .log`. AHS is
+  reported, not edited.
+- Re-parsing a sanitized dump yields the identical hardware inventory
+  (verified on Dell TSR, xFusion, Inspur onekeylog, H3C `.sds`).
+- Full contract and rule list: `bible-local/docs/log-sanitization.md`.
+- Tests: `internal/sanitize` (`TestRedactText_*`, `TestSanitize_Tar*`,
+  `TestSanitize_Zip_*`, `TestSanitize_BinaryMemberFlagged`,
+  `TestNeutralZonesAreValidAndSameLength`, `TestTZFiller`),
+  `internal/server` (`TestHandleSanitize_*`).

bible-local/README.md

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Keep top-level docs minimal and put maintained architecture/API contracts here.
 | [07-exporters.md](07-exporters.md) | Raw export, Reanimator export, batch convert |
 | [docs/hardware-ingest-contract.md](docs/hardware-ingest-contract.md) | Reanimator ingest schema mirrored locally |
 | [docs/privacy-scan.md](docs/privacy-scan.md) | Customer-data / anonymization scan of ingested sources |
+| [docs/log-sanitization.md](docs/log-sanitization.md) | In-place, length-preserving redaction of customer data |
 | [08-build-release.md](08-build-release.md) | Build and release workflow |
 | [09-testing.md](09-testing.md) | Test expectations and regression rules |
 | [10-decisions.md](10-decisions.md) | Architectural Decision Log |

bible-local/docs/log-sanitization.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Log sanitization
+
+`internal/sanitize` produces a de-identified copy of an uploaded diagnostic
+file. It is the redaction counterpart of the detection-only `internal/privacy`
+scan (see `privacy-scan.md`). ADL-067.
+
+## Contract
+
+- **Same format, same structure.** Archive entry names, modes, uid/gid, and all
+  embedded timestamps (tar `ModTime`/`AccessTime`/`ChangeTime`, gzip `Name`/
+  `ModTime`/`OS`, zip `Modified`/`Extra`) are preserved. Entry order is kept.
+- **Length-preserving replacement.** Every filler is the exact byte length of
+  the token it replaces, so tar/zip member sizes - and therefore the tar
+  headers and their checksums - are byte-identical. Untouched zip entries are
+  copied raw (`(*zip.Writer).Copy`).
+- **Byte-identical when nothing changes.** An uncompressed `.tar`/`.sds`/`.txt`/
+  `.log` with no redactable data comes out equal to the input. `.gz`/`.zip`
+  cannot be byte-identical because the compression layer is always rebuilt
+  (member payloads and metadata still match; only the compressed stream and the
+  total size differ).
+- **No marker.** Nothing is stamped into the file.
+- **Idempotent.** The fillers are on the privacy allowlist (`isRedactionFiller`),
+  so a re-scan finds nothing and a second `Sanitize` is a no-op.
+
+## Entry point
+
+```go
+sanitize.Sanitize(filename string, data []byte) (*sanitize.Result, error)
+sanitize.CanSanitize(filename string) bool   // .tar .sds .gz .tgz .zip .txt .log
+```
+
+`Result{ Data, Changes []Change, SkippedBinary []string, TotalReplaced }`.
+Format is resolved by extension; nested archives (`.tar.gz` in a `.zip`, ...)
+are rewritten recursively.
+
+## Fillers
+
+| Category | Example | Filler |
+|----------|---------|--------|
+| `domain`, `mgmt_subdomain`, `resolv`, `ad_ldap`, `nsupdate`, `collector`, `dhcp`, `cert` | `sigma.sbrf.ru` | letters/digits → `x`, punctuation kept → `xxxxx.xxxx.xx` |
+| `email` | `admin@corp.acme.ru` | `xxxxx@xxxx.xxxx.xx` |
+| `public_ip` | `93.184.216.34` | digits → `0`, dots kept → `00.000.000.00` (`net.ParseIP` → nil) |
+| `timezone` name | `Europe/Moscow` | same-length valid neutral IANA zone from `neutralZoneByLen` (`Etc/Universal`, `Antarctica/McMurdo`, ...) |
+| `timezone` offset | `SELTimeUTCOffset=180` | `000` |
+| `timezone` abbr | `... MSK 2026` | `UTC` (len 3), else `x`-fill |
+
+Timezone redaction changes the config value only; **event timestamps are never
+recomputed**, so a re-analysis of the sanitized dump may read event times in the
+wrong zone (the same trade-off as the KB manual cleanup).
+
+`fru_location` spans are **not** redacted (often a serial / manufacturing code,
+sometimes in a binary FRU area) - only reported by the scan.
+
+Private IPs, `pool.ntp.org` and everything else on the privacy allowlist are
+never touched. Vendor factory-template members (`*_tianyiyun`, `*.conf_bak`,
+`raw_export.json`, ...) are skipped whole (`privacy.IsAllowlistedFile`).
+
+## Not edited (`Result.SkippedBinary`)
+
+Reported for manual handling, never modified:
+- Binary members with a customer string in a printable run: `FRU.bin`
+  (Asset Tag), `redis-dump.rdb`, `SDR.dat`, SOL captures with control bytes,
+  `racsessioninfo` / `session_token`.
+- `configuration/conf/localtime` - a real UTC tzdata blob is a different length,
+  so it cannot be swapped in place.
+- Truncated / mis-named nested archives (copied verbatim).
+- HPE `.ahs` (proprietary container).
+
+## Surfaces
+
+| Where | How |
+|-------|-----|
+| API | `POST /api/sanitize` runs it on the retained upload bytes and returns the preview JSON (`total_replaced`, `changes[]`, `skipped_binary[]`); `GET /api/sanitize/download` streams the file (`Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="<original>"`, `application/octet-stream`). `422` for live-Redfish / snapshot sources. |
+| UI | "Обезличить и скачать копию" in the Customer-data panel (shown when `privacy-scan` reports `sanitizable: true`) → preview → download. |
+| CLI | `logpile -sanitize <file> [-sanitize-out <file>]` - edits in place (or writes `-sanitize-out`), restores mtime/atime via `os.Chtimes`, prints the change summary. ctime reflects the edit. |
+
+## Limits
+
+- Whole file is held in memory and rebuilt: `maxInputBytes` 800 MiB,
+  `maxMemberBytes` 1 GiB per decompressed member.
+- Fixtures and tests use `acme.ru` / `corp.acme.local` - never a real customer
+  domain, same rule as the privacy scan.

bible-local/docs/privacy-scan.md

@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ Reference data, not vendor-detection logic: RFC 2606/5737 names, `pool.ntp.org`
 `foobar.edu` / `issue.net` (stock `hosts.allow` / sshd banner), and factory
 default values (`Asia/Shanghai`, `To Be Filled By O.E.M.`, `NULL`, `0.0.0.0`).
 
+## Redaction
+
+`privacy.FindSpans(line, certFile)` is the matcher shared with
+`internal/sanitize`, which rewrites the same spans in place with same-length
+neutral fillers (see `log-sanitization.md`). The fillers are recognised by
+`isRedactionFiller` so a scan of a sanitized file is clean.
+
 ## Customer guess (`customer.go`)
 
 Findings in `domain`, `resolv`, `ad_ldap`, `cert`, `nsupdate`,

cmd/logpile/main.go

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ func main() {
 	file := flag.String("file", "", "Pre-load archive file")
 	showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "Show version")
 	noBrowser := flag.Bool("no-browser", false, "Don't open browser automatically")
+	sanitizeIn := flag.String("sanitize", "", "De-identify customer data in this archive/log and exit (no server)")
+	sanitizeOut := flag.String("sanitize-out", "", "Write the sanitized file here (default: overwrite -sanitize input)")
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	if *showVersion {
@@ -35,6 +37,14 @@ func main() {
 		os.Exit(0)
 	}
 
+	if *sanitizeIn != "" {
+		if err := runSanitize(*sanitizeIn, *sanitizeOut); err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "sanitize:", err)
+			os.Exit(1)
+		}
+		os.Exit(0)
+	}
+
 	// Set embedded web files
 	server.WebFS = web.FS
 

cmd/logpile/sanitize.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/sanitize"
+)
+
+// runSanitize de-identifies inPath and writes the result to outPath (or back to
+// inPath). The output file's mtime/atime are restored to the original; ctime
+// (inode change time) cannot be restored portably.
+func runSanitize(inPath, outPath string) error {
+	info, err := os.Stat(inPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(inPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !sanitize.CanSanitize(inPath) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported file format for sanitize: %s", inPath)
+	}
+
+	res, err := sanitize.Sanitize(inPath, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	target := outPath
+	if target == "" {
+		target = inPath
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(target, res.Data, info.Mode().Perm()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	mt := info.ModTime()
+	if err := os.Chtimes(target, mt, mt); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "warning: could not restore file timestamp:", err)
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("sanitized %s -> %s\n", inPath, target)
+	fmt.Printf("  %d replacement(s), %d byte(s) in, %d byte(s) out\n", res.TotalReplaced, len(data), len(res.Data))
+	for _, c := range res.Changes {
+		fmt.Printf("  [%-14s] x%-4d %s\n", c.Category, c.Count, c.Path)
+	}
+	if len(res.SkippedBinary) > 0 {
+		fmt.Printf("\n  %d member(s) hold customer data but could not be edited - sanitize by hand:\n", len(res.SkippedBinary))
+		for _, s := range res.SkippedBinary {
+			fmt.Printf("    - %s\n", s)
+		}
+	}
+	fmt.Println("\n  note: mtime/atime restored; ctime (inode change time) reflects the edit.")
+	return nil
+}

internal/privacy/allowlist.go

@@ -25,14 +25,26 @@ var (
 		"golang.org", "go.dev", "x.org", "sourceforge.net", "xyz.com", "yandex.net",
 		"haxx.se", "curl.se", "python.org", "perl.org", "isc.org", "sourceware.org",
 		"ipxe.org", "gnupg.org", "gnutls.org", "openldap.org", "netfilter.org",
+		"github.com", "githubusercontent.com", "typoland.com", "schemas.dell.com",
+		"googleapis.com", "gstatic.com", "jquery.com", "jsdelivr.net", "unpkg.com",
+		"cloudflare.com", "cloudflare.net", "certificate.fi",
 		"inspur.com", "inspurcloud.com", "inservice-iq.com", "ieisystem.com", "kaytus.com",
 		"jd.com", "jd.local", "jdcloud.com", "in-addr.arpa", "ip6.arpa", "arpa",
 	}
 
 	allowlistedValues = map[string]struct{}{
-		"asia/shanghai":          {},
+		"asia/shanghai": {},
-		"etc/utc":                {},
+		"etc/utc":       {},
-		"utc":                    {},
+		"etc/universal": {},
+		"utc":           {},
+		// neutral decoy zones the sanitizer writes in place of a real timezone
+		"pacific/tarawa":         {},
+		"atlantic/azores":        {},
+		"antarctica/troll":       {},
+		"antarctica/vostok":      {},
+		"antarctica/mcmurdo":     {},
+		"pacific/guadalcanal":    {},
+		"pacific/bougainville":   {},
 		"to be filled by o.e.m.": {},
 		"default string":         {},
 		"unknown":                {},
@@ -56,11 +68,15 @@ var (
 	// not customer data from the source.
 	allowlistedFilenameParts = []string{
 		"_tencent", "_jingdong", "_pdd", "_baidu", "_kuaishou", "_tianyiyun",
-		"_jd.", "syslog_jd", "snmptrapcfg", ".json_bak", "ntp_auto",
+		"_jd.", "syslog_jd", "snmptrapcfg", ".json_bak", ".conf_bak", "_bak",
-		"raw_export.json", "parser_fields.json", "collect.log",
+		"ntp_auto", "raw_export.json", "parser_fields.json", "collect.log",
 	}
 )
 
+// IsAllowlistedFile reports whether a member path is a vendor factory template
+// or a LOGPile-derived artifact that should not be scanned or redacted.
+func IsAllowlistedFile(name string) bool { return isAllowlistedFilename(name) }
+
 func isAllowlistedDomain(domain string) bool {
 	d := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(domain), "."))
 	for _, z := range allowlistedZones {
@@ -76,7 +92,28 @@ func isAllowlistedValue(v string) bool {
 	if _, ok := allowlistedValues[lv]; ok {
 		return true
 	}
-	return isAllowlistedDomain(v)
+	return isRedactionFiller(lv) || isAllowlistedDomain(v)
+}
+
+// isRedactionFiller recognises the internal/sanitize output so a re-scan or a
+// second sanitize pass of an already-cleaned file finds nothing: an all-'x'
+// hostname filler ("xxxxx.xxxx.xx", "x@xxxx.xxxx.xx", "xxxxxx/xxxxxx") or an
+// all-zero IP / offset filler ("00.000.000.00", "000", "-000").
+func isRedactionFiller(s string) bool {
+	if len(s) < 2 {
+		return false
+	}
+	hasFill := false
+	for _, r := range s {
+		switch {
+		case r == 'x' || r == '0':
+			hasFill = true
+		case r == '.' || r == '-' || r == '@' || r == ':' || r == '/' || r == '+':
+		default:
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return hasFill
 }
 
 func isAllowlistedFilename(p string) bool {

internal/privacy/ip.go

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ var nonSensitiveExact = map[string]struct{}{
 	"4.2.2.2": {}, "4.2.2.1": {}, "9.9.9.9": {}, "1.2.3.4": {}, "2.4.6.8": {},
 	"208.67.222.222": {}, "208.67.220.220": {},
 	"77.88.8.8": {}, "77.88.8.1": {}, "77.88.8.88": {}, // Yandex public DNS
+	"100.2.74.41": {}, // Kaytus/Inspur upnp/config.json factory default
 }
 
 // isSensitiveIP reports whether s is a routable address that could identify the

internal/privacy/rules.go

@@ -22,12 +22,30 @@ const (
 	catCollector     = "collector"
 	catCert          = "cert"
 	catFRULocation   = "fru_location"
-	catHostname      = "hostname"
 	catDHCP          = "dhcp"
 	catNSUpdate      = "nsupdate"
 	catMgmtSubdomain = "mgmt_subdomain"
 )
 
+// Span is a matched sensitive substring of one line: line[Start:End]. Detection
+// (Scan) and redaction (internal/sanitize) both consume the same spans so they
+// can never disagree about what counts as customer data.
+type Span struct {
+	Start, End int
+	Category   string
+}
+
+// FindSpans returns every sensitive span in a single line. certFile enables the
+// TLS-certificate rules (only meaningful for *.pem / *.csr members).
+func FindSpans(line string, certFile bool) []Span {
+	ms := findMatches(line, certFile)
+	out := make([]Span, 0, len(ms))
+	for _, m := range ms {
+		out = append(out, Span{Start: m.start, End: m.end, Category: m.category})
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // tableRule is a simple line-regexp rule. group is the submatch index used as
 // the reported token (0 = whole match).
 type tableRule struct {
@@ -38,6 +56,14 @@ type tableRule struct {
 	hint     string
 }
 
+type matchSpan struct {
+	start, end int
+	category   string
+	severity   string
+	hint       string
+	match      string
+}
+
 var (
 	// Match any dotted name ending in a 2-24 char alpha label; plausibleFQDN
 	// then decides whether that final label is a real TLD.
@@ -55,7 +81,10 @@ var (
 	reGoRuntime = regexp.MustCompile(`/go-mod/|\bgoroutine \d|\.go:\d+`)
 	// A dotted quad sitting on a line that is talking about a version or a spec
 	// clause, not a host.
-	reVersionContext = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\bversion|\bver\.?\b|_ver\b|fw[_ ]?ver|\brevision|vbios|firmware|\bbios\b|microcode|ucode|\bbuild\b|x\.?org|xserver|ieee|\bstd\b|clause|section|\brfc\b)`)
+	reVersionContext = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(version|\bver\.?\b|_ver\b|fw[_ ]?ver|\brevision|vbios|firmware|\bbios\b|microcode|ucode|\bbuild\b|x\.?org|xserver|ieee|\bstd\b|clause|section|\brfc\b)`)
+	// syslog selector "local7.info", "mail.err" - a facility.severity pair, not a
+	// domain.
+	reSyslogSelector = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^(?:\*|local[0-7]|auth|authpriv|cron|daemon|ftp|kern|lpr|mail|news|security|syslog|user|uucp)\.(?:\*|emerg|panic|alert|crit|err|error|warn|warning|notice|info|debug|none)$`)
 	// A TLD label written Title-case ("OS.It", "Rodolfo.Cn") is prose or mojibake,
 	// not a real domain (real ones are lower- or all-upper-case).
 	reTitlecaseTail = regexp.MustCompile(`\.[A-Z][a-z]+$`)
@@ -88,13 +117,23 @@ var (
 	}
 )
 
-func scanLine(path, line string, ln int, certFile bool, emit func(models.PrivacyFinding)) {
+// findMatches is the single matcher shared by Scan and FindSpans. It returns
-	var local []models.PrivacyFinding
+// every accepted span on the line, before the Scan-only "already covered by a
-	specific := map[string]struct{}{} // matches from categories more precise than a bare FQDN
+// more specific category" dedupe.
+func findMatches(line string, certFile bool) []matchSpan {
+	var out []matchSpan
+	specific := map[string]struct{}{}
 	noiseLine := reKernelTimestamp.MatchString(line) || reGoRuntime.MatchString(line)
 
-	add := func(cat, sev, match, hint string) {
+	add := func(cat, sev, hint string, s, e int) {
-		match = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(match), `"',;:`)
+		if s < 0 || e > len(line) || s >= e {
+			return
+		}
+		s, e = trimSpan(line, s, e)
+		if s >= e {
+			return
+		}
+		match := line[s:e]
 		if len(match) < 2 || !strings.ContainsFunc(match, isAlnum) || isAllowlistedValue(match) {
 			return
 		}
@@ -107,26 +146,28 @@ func scanLine(path, line string, ln int, certFile bool, emit func(models.Privacy
 		if cat != catDomain && cat != catEmail && cat != catPublicIP {
 			specific[strings.ToLower(match)] = struct{}{}
 		}
-		local = append(local, models.PrivacyFinding{
+		out = append(out, matchSpan{start: s, end: e, category: cat, severity: sev, hint: hint, match: match})
-			Category: cat, Severity: sev, Path: path, Line: ln,
+	}
-			Match: match, Excerpt: excerpt(line), Hint: hint,
+
-		})
+	groupSpan := func(m []int, group int) (int, int) {
+		if 2*group+1 >= len(m) {
+			return -1, -1
+		}
+		return m[2*group], m[2*group+1]
 	}
 
 	for _, r := range tableRules {
-		for _, m := range r.re.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
+		for _, m := range r.re.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
-			if r.group < len(m) {
+			s, e := groupSpan(m, r.group)
-				add(r.category, r.severity, m[r.group], r.hint)
+			add(r.category, r.severity, r.hint, s, e)
-			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	if certFile {
 		for _, r := range certLineRules {
-			for _, m := range r.re.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
+			for _, m := range r.re.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
-				if r.group < len(m) {
+				s, e := groupSpan(m, r.group)
-					add(r.category, r.severity, m[r.group], r.hint)
+				add(r.category, r.severity, r.hint, s, e)
-				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -138,13 +179,13 @@ func scanLine(path, line string, ln int, certFile bool, emit func(models.Privacy
 				continue
 			}
 			fqdn := line[s:e]
-			if isAllowlistedDomain(fqdn) || !plausibleFQDN(fqdn) || reTitlecaseTail.MatchString(fqdn) {
+			if isAllowlistedDomain(fqdn) || !plausibleFQDN(fqdn) || reTitlecaseTail.MatchString(fqdn) || reSyslogSelector.MatchString(fqdn) {
 				continue
 			}
 			labels := strings.Split(strings.ToLower(fqdn), ".")
 			cat, sev, hint := catDomain, severityLow, "domain / FQDN in the logs"
 			if len(labels) >= 3 {
-				sev = severityMedium // a real subdomain, not a stray two-word token
+				sev = severityMedium
 			}
 			for _, lbl := range labels {
 				if _, ok := mgmtLabels[lbl]; ok {
@@ -152,54 +193,75 @@ func scanLine(path, line string, ln int, certFile bool, emit func(models.Privacy
 					break
 				}
 			}
-			add(cat, sev, fqdn, hint)
+			add(cat, sev, hint, s, e)
 		}
-	}
+
-	if !noiseLine {
+		for _, m := range reEmail.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
-		for _, m := range reEmail.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
+			s, e := m[2], m[3]
-			host := m[1][strings.IndexByte(m[1], '@')+1:]
+			addr := line[s:e]
+			host := addr[strings.IndexByte(addr, '@')+1:]
 			if isAllowlistedDomain(host) || !looksLikeMailHost(host) {
 				continue
 			}
-			add(catEmail, severityMedium, m[1], "e-mail address")
+			add(catEmail, severityMedium, "e-mail address", s, e)
 		}
 	}
-	for _, m := range reSyslogTarget.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
+
-		add(catCollector, severityMedium, m[1], "remote syslog target")
+	for _, m := range reSyslogTarget.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
+		add(catCollector, severityMedium, "remote syslog target", m[2], m[3])
 	}
+
 	commentLine := strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "#") || strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), ";")
 	if !noiseLine && !commentLine && !reVersionContext.MatchString(line) {
 		for _, loc := range reIPv4.FindAllStringIndex(line, -1) {
 			if inDottedNumberRun(line, loc[0], loc[1]) {
-				continue // part of a longer version string like "18:6.1.4.5"
+				continue
 			}
 			ip := line[loc[0]:loc[1]]
 			if strings.HasSuffix(ip, ".0") || strings.HasPrefix(ip, "0.") || strings.HasPrefix(ip, "1.") {
-				continue // network address, or a 0./1. version-style quad
+				continue
 			}
 			if !isSensitiveIP(ip) {
 				continue
 			}
-			add(catPublicIP, severityMedium, ip, "public IP reveals provider / site")
+			add(catPublicIP, severityMedium, "public IP reveals provider / site", loc[0], loc[1])
 		}
 	}
-	if ll := strings.ToLower(line); strings.Contains(ll, "timezone") || strings.Contains(ll, "zoneinfo") || strings.Contains(ll, "localtime") || strings.Contains(ll, "tz=") {
-		for _, m := range reTZName.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
-			if isAllowlistedValue(m[1]) {
-				continue
-			}
-			add(catTimezone, severityMedium, m[1], "timezone reveals region - set Etc/UTC")
-		}
-	}
-	for _, m := range reTZAbbr.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
-		add(catTimezone, severityLow, m[1], "localized timestamp reveals region")
-	}
 
-	for _, f := range local {
+	if ll := strings.ToLower(line); strings.Contains(ll, "timezone") || strings.Contains(ll, "zoneinfo") || strings.Contains(ll, "localtime") || strings.Contains(ll, "tz=") {
-		if (f.Category == catDomain || f.Category == catEmail) && matchCoveredBySpecific(f.Match, specific) {
+		for _, m := range reTZName.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
-			continue
+			s, e := m[2], m[3]
+			if isAllowlistedValue(line[s:e]) {
+				continue
+			}
+			add(catTimezone, severityMedium, "timezone reveals region - set Etc/UTC", s, e)
 		}
-		emit(f)
+	}
+	for _, m := range reTZAbbr.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(line, -1) {
+		add(catTimezone, severityLow, "localized timestamp reveals region", m[2], m[3])
+	}
+
+	// Scan-only dedupe: drop a bare domain/email span when the same token is
+	// already covered by a more specific category on this line.
+	if len(specific) > 0 {
+		filtered := out[:0]
+		for _, m := range out {
+			if (m.category == catDomain || m.category == catEmail) && matchCoveredBySpecific(m.match, specific) {
+				continue
+			}
+			filtered = append(filtered, m)
+		}
+		out = filtered
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func scanLine(path, line string, ln int, certFile bool, emit func(models.PrivacyFinding)) {
+	for _, m := range findMatches(line, certFile) {
+		emit(models.PrivacyFinding{
+			Category: m.category, Severity: m.severity, Path: path, Line: ln,
+			Match: m.match, Excerpt: excerpt(line), Hint: m.hint,
+		})
 	}
 }
 
@@ -207,6 +269,19 @@ func isAlnum(r rune) bool {
 	return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
 }
 
+// trimSpan narrows [s,e) past leading/trailing quoting and separator bytes,
+// matching the old strings.Trim(TrimSpace(...), "\"',;:") behaviour.
+func trimSpan(line string, s, e int) (int, int) {
+	const cut = " \t\"',;:"
+	for s < e && strings.IndexByte(cut, line[s]) >= 0 {
+		s++
+	}
+	for e > s && strings.IndexByte(cut, line[e-1]) >= 0 {
+		e--
+	}
+	return s, e
+}
+
 // cleanTokenBoundary reports whether line[s:e] stands as its own token - not
 // glued to surrounding identifier characters ("auth.backend.gssapi.store-creds",
 // "mountall.sh [start]" is fine, "96.00.CF.00" is not) - so it reads as a
@@ -216,7 +291,6 @@ func cleanTokenBoundary(line string, s, e int) bool {
 		switch c := line[s-1]; c {
 		case ' ', '\t', '"', '\'', '(', '<', '=', ',', '@':
 		case '/', ':':
-			// ok (URL / "server = host:port"), but not a bare path segment
 		default:
 			return false
 		}
@@ -225,7 +299,7 @@ func cleanTokenBoundary(line string, s, e int) bool {
 		switch line[e] {
 		case ' ', '\t', '"', '\'', ')', '>', ',', ';', ':', '/', '\\', '?', '!':
 		default:
-			return false // trailing '.', '-', letter, digit -> mid-identifier
+			return false
 		}
 	}
 	return true
@@ -272,32 +346,27 @@ func usefulFRUValue(v string) bool {
 		}
 	}
 	if digits == len(v) {
-		return false // pure number: date/manufacturing code
+		return false
 	}
 	if upperAlnum == len(v) && digits >= 4 {
-		return false // looks like a serial number (7J..., 21D634070)
+		return false
 	}
 	return true
 }
 
 // looksLikeMailHost rejects the many "local@identifier.token" strings that are
 // not e-mail: OData/Redfish JSON annotations (Members@odata.count), SSH
-// cipher/kex names (aes256-gcm@openssh.com is handled by the domain allowlist,
+// cipher/kex names, systemd units ("serial-getty@ttyAMA0.service").
-// but the shape is the same).
 func looksLikeMailHost(host string) bool {
 	h := strings.ToLower(host)
 	if strings.Contains(h, "odata") || strings.Contains(h, "redfish") || strings.Contains(h, "message.") {
 		return false
 	}
-	// systemd templated units ("serial-getty@ttyAMA0.service"), Go toolchain
-	// pseudo-versions ("toolchain@v0.0.1-go1.25.0.linux") and the like all fail
-	// the real-TLD check.
 	return plausibleFQDN(h)
 }
 
-// matchCoveredBySpecific reports whether a bare FQDN/e-mail finding is already
+// matchCoveredBySpecific reports whether a bare FQDN/e-mail match is already
-// represented by a more precise finding on the same line (e.g. the resolv.conf
+// represented by a more precise finding on the same line.
-// "domain corp.acme.ru" line yields both a resolv and a domain hit).
 func matchCoveredBySpecific(match string, specific map[string]struct{}) bool {
 	m := strings.ToLower(match)
 	if _, ok := specific[m]; ok {

internal/sanitize/archive.go

@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+package sanitize
+
+import (
+	"archive/tar"
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"path"
+	"strings"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/privacy"
+)
+
+const (
+	maxInputBytes  = 800 << 20 // whole file, read into memory and rebuilt
+	maxMemberBytes = 1 << 30   // single decompressed member
+)
+
+// rewriteBytes de-identifies data according to its format (by filename
+// extension), recursing into nested archives. It returns the rebuilt bytes plus
+// the replacements made and any binary members that held customer data but
+// could not be edited safely.
+func rewriteBytes(name string, data []byte) (out []byte, changes []change, skippedBinary []string, err error) {
+	switch strings.ToLower(path.Ext(name)) {
+	case ".tar", ".sds":
+		return rewriteTar(name, data)
+	case ".gz", ".tgz":
+		return rewriteGz(name, data)
+	case ".zip":
+		return rewriteZip(name, data)
+	case ".ahs":
+		// Proprietary HPE container - not editable in place. Report if it holds
+		// customer data.
+		if scanHasFindings(data) {
+			return data, nil, []string{name + " (HPE AHS container - sanitize manually)"}, nil
+		}
+		return data, nil, nil, nil
+	case ".txt", ".log":
+		if privacy.IsAllowlistedFile(name) {
+			return data, nil, nil, nil
+		}
+		nb, ch := redactText(data, isCertName(name))
+		return nb, prefixPath(ch, path.Base(name)), nil, nil
+	default:
+		return rewriteMember(name, data, false)
+	}
+}
+
+// rewriteMember handles one file inside an archive: recurse if it is itself an
+// archive, redact if it is text, otherwise leave it (and flag it when a binary
+// member carries customer data). Returned changes/skips are already qualified
+// with name, so callers append them verbatim.
+func rewriteMember(name string, data []byte, isDirOrSpecial bool) ([]byte, []change, []string, error) {
+	if isDirOrSpecial || len(data) == 0 || privacy.IsAllowlistedFile(name) {
+		return data, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+	if isNestedArchive(name) || looksLikeTar(data) {
+		nb, ch, skip, err := rewriteBytes(name, data)
+		if err == nil {
+			return nb, prefixPath(ch, name), prefixNames(skip, name), nil
+		}
+		// A truncated / mis-named "archive" must not fail the whole job: treat it
+		// as a plain file if it is text, otherwise copy it and flag it.
+		if looksLikeText(data) {
+			nb, ch := redactText(data, isCertName(name))
+			return nb, prefixPath(ch, name), nil, nil
+		}
+		if len(data) <= 8<<20 && binaryHasLeak(data) {
+			return data, nil, []string{name + " (unreadable as an archive; holds customer data - sanitize manually)"}, nil
+		}
+		return data, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+	if looksLikeText(data) {
+		nb, ch := redactText(data, isCertName(name))
+		return nb, prefixPath(ch, name), nil, nil
+	}
+	// Binary member: never edit it (checksums / structure), but tell the
+	// operator if a printable run inside it holds customer data.
+	if len(data) <= 8<<20 && binaryHasLeak(data) {
+		return data, nil, []string{name + " (binary - sanitize manually)"}, nil
+	}
+	return data, nil, nil, nil
+}
+
+func rewriteTar(name string, data []byte) ([]byte, []change, []string, error) {
+	tr := tar.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
+	var changes []change
+	var skipped []string
+
+	for {
+		hdr, err := tr.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: tar read: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(tr, maxMemberBytes+1))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: read %s: %w", name, hdr.Name, err)
+		}
+		special := !hdr.FileInfo().Mode().IsRegular()
+		newBody, ch, skip, err := rewriteMember(hdr.Name, body, special || int64(len(body)) > maxMemberBytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, err
+		}
+		h := *hdr // reuse every header field verbatim (name, mode, uid/gid, mtime/atime/ctime, pax, format)
+		h.Size = int64(len(newBody))
+		if err := tw.WriteHeader(&h); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: write header %s: %w", name, hdr.Name, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tw.Write(newBody); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, err
+		}
+		changes = append(changes, ch...)
+		skipped = append(skipped, skip...)
+	}
+	if len(changes) == 0 {
+		return data, nil, skipped, nil // nothing redacted -> byte-identical
+	}
+	if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), changes, skipped, nil
+}
+
+func rewriteGz(name string, data []byte) ([]byte, []change, []string, error) {
+	gzr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: gzip: %w", name, err)
+	}
+	hdr := gzr.Header
+	decompressed, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(gzr, maxMemberBytes+1))
+	gzr.Close()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: gunzip: %w", name, err)
+	}
+	if int64(len(decompressed)) > maxMemberBytes {
+		return data, nil, []string{name + " (too large to sanitize)"}, nil
+	}
+
+	innerName := strings.TrimSuffix(hdr.Name, ".gz")
+	if innerName == "" {
+		innerName = strings.TrimSuffix(path.Base(name), ".gz")
+	}
+
+	var newInner []byte
+	var ch []change
+	var skip []string
+	switch {
+	case looksLikeTar(decompressed):
+		newInner, ch, skip, err = rewriteTar(innerName, decompressed)
+		if err != nil {
+			return data, nil, []string{name + " (unreadable inner tar - copied as-is)"}, nil
+		}
+	case privacy.IsAllowlistedFile(innerName):
+		newInner = decompressed
+	case looksLikeText(decompressed):
+		newInner, ch = redactText(decompressed, isCertName(innerName))
+		ch = prefixPath(ch, innerName)
+	case len(decompressed) <= 8<<20 && binaryHasLeak(decompressed):
+		newInner, skip = decompressed, []string{innerName + " (binary - sanitize manually)"}
+	default:
+		newInner = decompressed
+	}
+	if len(ch) == 0 {
+		return data, nil, skip, nil // nothing redacted -> byte-identical
+	}
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	gzw, _ := gzip.NewWriterLevel(&buf, gzip.BestCompression)
+	gzw.Name = hdr.Name
+	gzw.Comment = hdr.Comment
+	gzw.ModTime = hdr.ModTime
+	gzw.OS = hdr.OS
+	gzw.Extra = hdr.Extra
+	if _, err := gzw.Write(newInner); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+	if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), ch, skip, nil
+}
+
+func rewriteZip(name string, data []byte) ([]byte, []change, []string, error) {
+	zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: zip: %w", name, err)
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	zw := zip.NewWriter(&buf)
+	if zr.Comment != "" {
+		_ = zw.SetComment(zr.Comment)
+	}
+	var changes []change
+	var skipped []string
+
+	for _, f := range zr.File {
+		if f.FileInfo().IsDir() {
+			if err := zw.Copy(f); err != nil {
+				return nil, nil, nil, err
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		rc, err := f.Open()
+		if err == nil {
+			var body []byte
+			body, err = io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rc, maxMemberBytes+1))
+			rc.Close()
+			if err == nil {
+				newBody, ch, skip, mErr := rewriteMember(f.Name, body, int64(len(body)) > maxMemberBytes)
+				if mErr == nil {
+					if bytes.Equal(newBody, body) {
+						if err := zw.Copy(f); err != nil {
+							return nil, nil, nil, err
+						}
+					} else {
+						fh := f.FileHeader
+						fh.CRC32, fh.CompressedSize, fh.CompressedSize64 = 0, 0, 0
+						fh.UncompressedSize, fh.UncompressedSize64 = 0, 0
+						w, cErr := zw.CreateHeader(&fh)
+						if cErr != nil {
+							return nil, nil, nil, cErr
+						}
+						if _, wErr := w.Write(newBody); wErr != nil {
+							return nil, nil, nil, wErr
+						}
+					}
+					changes = append(changes, ch...)
+					skipped = append(skipped, skip...)
+					continue
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		// Unreadable / unprocessable entry: copy it raw, flag it.
+		if err := zw.Copy(f); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: copy %s: %w", name, f.Name, err)
+		}
+		skipped = append(skipped, f.Name+" (unreadable zip entry - copied as-is)")
+	}
+	if len(changes) == 0 {
+		return data, nil, skipped, nil // nothing redacted -> byte-identical
+	}
+	if err := zw.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), changes, skipped, nil
+}
+
+func isNestedArchive(name string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(path.Ext(name)) {
+	case ".gz", ".tgz", ".tar", ".zip", ".sds":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func isCertName(name string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(path.Ext(name)) {
+	case ".pem", ".csr", ".crt", ".cer":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func looksLikeTar(b []byte) bool {
+	if len(b) < 512 {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := tar.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(b)).Next()
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+// looksLikeText mirrors the privacy scanner's heuristic: no NUL byte in the
+// first 8 KiB.
+func looksLikeText(b []byte) bool {
+	if len(b) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	head := b
+	if len(head) > 8192 {
+		head = head[:8192]
+	}
+	return bytes.IndexByte(head, 0) < 0
+}
+
+func scanHasFindings(b []byte) bool {
+	rep := privacy.Scan([]privacy.File{{Path: "member", Content: b}})
+	return rep != nil && rep.Summary.Total > 0
+}
+
+// binaryHasLeak reports whether any printable ASCII run inside a binary member
+// contains a redactable span (privacy.Scan itself skips non-text files, so it
+// cannot see strings embedded in FRU.bin / redis-dump.rdb / SDR.dat).
+func binaryHasLeak(b []byte) bool {
+	start := -1
+	check := func(run []byte) bool {
+		if len(run) < 6 {
+			return false
+		}
+		for _, sp := range privacy.FindSpans(string(run), false) {
+			if redactableCat[sp.Category] {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	for i, c := range b {
+		printable := c >= 0x20 && c < 0x7f
+		if printable && start < 0 {
+			start = i
+		}
+		if !printable && start >= 0 {
+			if check(b[start:i]) {
+				return true
+			}
+			start = -1
+		}
+	}
+	if start >= 0 && check(b[start:]) {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func prefixPath(ch []change, parent string) []change {
+	for i := range ch {
+		if ch[i].path == "" {
+			ch[i].path = parent
+		} else {
+			ch[i].path = parent + "::" + ch[i].path
+		}
+	}
+	return ch
+}
+
+func prefixNames(names []string, parent string) []string {
+	out := make([]string, len(names))
+	for i, n := range names {
+		out[i] = parent + "::" + n
+	}
+	return out
+}

internal/sanitize/redact.go

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+package sanitize
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"strings"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/privacy"
+)
+
+// Span categories that get rewritten. fru_location is intentionally excluded
+// (often a serial / manufacturing code, low value, and may live in a binary
+// FRU area); it is only reported by the scan, never edited.
+var redactableCat = map[string]bool{
+	"domain": true, "mgmt_subdomain": true, "resolv": true, "ad_ldap": true,
+	"email": true, "nsupdate": true, "collector": true, "dhcp": true,
+	"cert": true, "public_ip": true, "timezone": true,
+}
+
+type change struct {
+	path     string
+	category string
+	before   string
+	after    string
+}
+
+// redactText rewrites every redactable span in content, keeping each
+// replacement byte-for-byte the same length as the original so the total
+// content length never changes. Line terminators are preserved exactly.
+func redactText(content []byte, certFile bool) ([]byte, []change) {
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+	out.Grow(len(content))
+	var changes []change
+
+	for _, s := range splitKeepEOL(content) {
+		spans := redactableSpans(s.line, certFile)
+		if len(spans) == 0 {
+			out.WriteString(s.line)
+			out.Write(s.eol)
+			continue
+		}
+		prev := 0
+		for _, sp := range spans {
+			out.WriteString(s.line[prev:sp.Start])
+			orig := s.line[sp.Start:sp.End]
+			repl := fillerFor(sp.Category, orig)
+			if len(repl) != len(orig) {
+				repl = xFill(orig)
+			}
+			out.WriteString(repl)
+			changes = append(changes, change{category: sp.Category, before: orig, after: repl})
+			prev = sp.End
+		}
+		out.WriteString(s.line[prev:])
+		out.Write(s.eol)
+	}
+	return out.Bytes(), changes
+}
+
+// redactableSpans returns the redactable spans of one line, sorted by start and
+// with overlaps merged (so a nested domain inside an e-mail is redacted once).
+func redactableSpans(line string, certFile bool) []privacy.Span {
+	raw := privacy.FindSpans(line, certFile)
+	kept := raw[:0]
+	for _, sp := range raw {
+		if redactableCat[sp.Category] {
+			kept = append(kept, sp)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(kept) < 2 {
+		return kept
+	}
+	sortSpans(kept)
+	merged := kept[:1]
+	for _, sp := range kept[1:] {
+		last := &merged[len(merged)-1]
+		if sp.Start <= last.End {
+			if sp.End > last.End {
+				last.End = sp.End
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		merged = append(merged, sp)
+	}
+	return merged
+}
+
+func sortSpans(s []privacy.Span) {
+	for i := 1; i < len(s); i++ {
+		for j := i; j > 0 && s[j-1].Start > s[j].Start; j-- {
+			s[j-1], s[j] = s[j], s[j-1]
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// fillerFor returns a same-length neutral replacement for one matched token.
+func fillerFor(category, orig string) string {
+	switch category {
+	case "public_ip":
+		return digitZero(orig) // 93.184.216.34 -> 00.000.000.00
+	case "timezone":
+		return tzFiller(orig)
+	default:
+		return xFill(orig) // sigma.sbrf.ru -> xxxxx.xxxx.xx
+	}
+}
+
+// xFill replaces every ASCII letter/digit with 'x', keeping punctuation
+// (dots, hyphens, '@', ':', '*', '_') in place.
+func xFill(s string) string {
+	b := []byte(s)
+	for i, c := range b {
+		if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+			b[i] = 'x'
+		}
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
+
+// digitZero replaces every digit with '0', keeping dots.
+func digitZero(s string) string {
+	b := []byte(s)
+	for i, c := range b {
+		if c >= '0' && c <= '9' {
+			b[i] = '0'
+		}
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
+
+// tzFiller neutralises a timezone value: a numeric UTC offset becomes zeros, a
+// Region/City name becomes a same-length valid IANA zone, an abbreviation
+// becomes "UTC" (len 3) or an x-fill.
+func tzFiller(orig string) string {
+	if isOffset(orig) {
+		return digitZero(orig) // 180 -> 000, -300 -> -000
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(orig, "/") {
+		if z, ok := neutralZoneByLen[len(orig)]; ok {
+			return z
+		}
+		return keepSlashXFill(orig)
+	}
+	if len(orig) == 3 {
+		return "UTC"
+	}
+	return xFill(orig)
+}
+
+func isOffset(s string) bool {
+	if s == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i, c := range s {
+		if c >= '0' && c <= '9' {
+			continue
+		}
+		if (c == '+' || c == '-') && i == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func keepSlashXFill(s string) string {
+	b := []byte(xFill(s))
+	for i, c := range []byte(s) {
+		if c == '/' {
+			b[i] = '/'
+		}
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
+
+// neutralZoneByLen maps a timezone-name length to a same-length, valid IANA
+// zone that carries no regional information (UTC/Etc/* where the length allows,
+// otherwise a fixed far-away decoy). Every value here is on the privacy
+// allowlist so a re-scan of the sanitized file stays clean.
+var neutralZoneByLen = map[int]string{
+	3:  "UTC",
+	4:  "Zulu",
+	7:  "Etc/UTC",
+	8:  "Etc/GMT0",
+	9:  "Universal",
+	10: "US/Pacific",
+	11: "Brazil/East",
+	12: "Canada/Yukon",
+	13: "Etc/Universal",
+	14: "Pacific/Tarawa",
+	15: "Atlantic/Azores",
+	16: "Antarctica/Troll",
+	17: "Antarctica/Vostok",
+	18: "Antarctica/McMurdo",
+	19: "Pacific/Guadalcanal",
+	20: "Pacific/Bougainville",
+}
+
+type eolSeg struct {
+	line string
+	eol  []byte
+}
+
+// splitKeepEOL splits content into lines while preserving each original line
+// terminator ("\n", "\r\n", or none for a final unterminated line).
+func splitKeepEOL(b []byte) []eolSeg {
+	var segs []eolSeg
+	i := 0
+	for i < len(b) {
+		j := bytes.IndexByte(b[i:], '\n')
+		if j < 0 {
+			segs = append(segs, eolSeg{line: string(b[i:])})
+			return segs
+		}
+		nl := i + j
+		lineEnd := nl
+		if lineEnd > i && b[lineEnd-1] == '\r' {
+			lineEnd--
+		}
+		segs = append(segs, eolSeg{line: string(b[i:lineEnd]), eol: append([]byte(nil), b[lineEnd:nl+1]...)})
+		i = nl + 1
+	}
+	return segs
+}

internal/sanitize/redact_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package sanitize
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestNeutralZonesAreValidAndSameLength(t *testing.T) {
+	// If the runtime has no zoneinfo at all, skip the loadability half.
+	_, tzErr := time.LoadLocation("Europe/Moscow")
+	haveTZDB := tzErr == nil
+
+	for n, zone := range neutralZoneByLen {
+		if len(zone) != n {
+			t.Errorf("neutralZoneByLen[%d] = %q has length %d", n, zone, len(zone))
+		}
+		if haveTZDB {
+			if _, err := time.LoadLocation(zone); err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("neutral zone %q does not load: %v", zone, err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTZFiller(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"Europe/Moscow":      "Etc/Universal",
+		"Asia/Yekaterinburg": "Antarctica/McMurdo",
+		"180":                "000",
+		"-300":               "-000",
+		"MSK":                "UTC",
+	}
+	for in, want := range cases {
+		if got := tzFiller(in); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("tzFiller(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
+		}
+		if got := tzFiller(in); len(got) != len(in) {
+			t.Errorf("tzFiller(%q) length %d != %d", in, len(got), len(in))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRedact_SkipsAllowlistedTemplateFile(t *testing.T) {
+	// _tianyiyun is a vendor factory template - must not be scanned/redacted.
+	nb, ch, _, err := rewriteBytes("onekeylog/configuration/conf/syslog_tianyiyun.conf_bak", []byte("server ntp.acme.ru\n"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(ch) != 0 || string(nb) != "server ntp.acme.ru\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("template file was modified: %q %+v", nb, ch)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestXFill(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := xFill("a1-b2.c3_d4@e5:f6"); got != "xx-xx.xx_xx@xx:xx" {
+		t.Fatalf("xFill = %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(xFill("corp.acme.ru"), "xxxx.") {
+		t.Fatalf("xFill domain: %q", xFill("corp.acme.ru"))
+	}
+}

internal/sanitize/sanitize.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// Package sanitize produces a de-identified copy of an uploaded diagnostic file.
+//
+// It rewrites the customer-identifying spans that internal/privacy detects
+// (domains, FQDNs, e-mails, AD config, public IPs, timezone) with same-length
+// neutral fillers, in place, without changing the file format: archive
+// structure, entry names, modes and embedded timestamps are preserved; only the
+// redacted byte ranges - and, for compressed containers, the compression layer
+// - differ. Detection only ever reports; this is the matching redactor. See
+// bible-local/docs/log-sanitization.md.
+package sanitize
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Change is one aggregated group of replacements for the preview UI.
+type Change struct {
+	Path         string `json:"path"`
+	Category     string `json:"category"`
+	Count        int    `json:"count"`
+	SampleBefore string `json:"sample_before"`
+	SampleAfter  string `json:"sample_after"`
+}
+
+// Result is the outcome of sanitizing one file.
+type Result struct {
+	Data          []byte   `json:"-"`
+	Changes       []Change `json:"changes"`
+	SkippedBinary []string `json:"skipped_binary"`
+	TotalReplaced int      `json:"total_replaced"`
+}
+
+// Sanitize de-identifies data (named filename so the format can be resolved by
+// extension, same set as the parser accepts) and returns the rebuilt file plus
+// a summary of what changed.
+func Sanitize(filename string, data []byte) (*Result, error) {
+	if len(data) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty input")
+	}
+	if len(data) > maxInputBytes {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("file too large to sanitize in memory: %d bytes (limit %d)", len(data), maxInputBytes)
+	}
+
+	out, changes, skipped, err := rewriteBytes(filename, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	res := &Result{
+		Data:          out,
+		TotalReplaced: len(changes),
+		Changes:       aggregate(changes),
+		SkippedBinary: dedupeStrings(skipped),
+	}
+	return res, nil
+}
+
+func aggregate(raw []change) []Change {
+	type key struct{ path, cat string }
+	m := map[key]*Change{}
+	order := []key{}
+	for _, c := range raw {
+		k := key{c.path, c.category}
+		g := m[k]
+		if g == nil {
+			g = &Change{Path: c.path, Category: c.category, SampleBefore: c.before, SampleAfter: c.after}
+			m[k] = g
+			order = append(order, k)
+		}
+		g.Count++
+	}
+	out := make([]Change, 0, len(order))
+	for _, k := range order {
+		out = append(out, *m[k])
+	}
+	sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if out[i].Category != out[j].Category {
+			return out[i].Category < out[j].Category
+		}
+		return out[i].Path < out[j].Path
+	})
+	return out
+}
+
+func dedupeStrings(in []string) []string {
+	if len(in) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	seen := map[string]struct{}{}
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(in))
+	for _, s := range in {
+		s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
+		if s == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[s]; ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[s] = struct{}{}
+		out = append(out, s)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(out)
+	return out
+}
+
+// CanSanitize reports whether a file with this name is a format the sanitizer
+// can rebuild.
+func CanSanitize(filename string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(ext(filename)) {
+	case ".tar", ".sds", ".gz", ".tgz", ".zip", ".txt", ".log":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func ext(name string) string {
+	if i := strings.LastIndexByte(name, '.'); i >= 0 {
+		return name[i:]
+	}
+	return ""
+}

internal/sanitize/sanitize_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+package sanitize
+
+import (
+	"archive/tar"
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/privacy"
+)
+
+const leakLog = "" +
+	"domain corp.acme.ru\n" +
+	"nameserver 10.0.0.1\n" +
+	"racdomain=corp.acme.ru\n" +
+	"server ntp01.acme.ru\n" +
+	"contact ops@corp.acme.ru\n" +
+	"outbound 93.184.216.34 established\n" +
+	"TimeZone=Europe/Moscow\n" +
+	"SELTimeUTCOffset=180\n" +
+	"pool at pool.ntp.org keep\n"
+
+func scanClean(t *testing.T, name string, data []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	rep := privacy.Scan([]privacy.File{{Path: name, Content: data}})
+	if rep != nil && rep.Summary.Total > 0 {
+		var b strings.Builder
+		for _, f := range rep.Findings {
+			b.WriteString("\n  " + f.Category + " " + f.Match)
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("%s still has %d findings:%s", name, rep.Summary.Total, b.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRedactText_LengthPreservedAndClean(t *testing.T) {
+	in := []byte(leakLog)
+	out, changes := redactText(in, false)
+
+	if len(out) != len(in) {
+		t.Fatalf("length changed: %d -> %d", len(in), len(out))
+	}
+	if len(changes) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no changes made")
+	}
+	scanClean(t, "out.log", out)
+
+	// idempotent
+	out2, ch2 := redactText(out, false)
+	if !bytes.Equal(out, out2) || len(ch2) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("not idempotent: %d more changes\n%q", len(ch2), out2)
+	}
+
+	s := string(out)
+	if strings.Contains(s, "acme.ru") || strings.Contains(s, "93.184.216.34") || strings.Contains(s, "Europe/Moscow") {
+		t.Fatalf("leak survived:\n%s", s)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "pool.ntp.org") {
+		t.Fatal("allowlisted pool.ntp.org was redacted")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "10.0.0.1") {
+		t.Fatal("private IP was redacted")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "TimeZone=Etc/Universal") {
+		t.Fatalf("timezone not neutralised to a same-length zone:\n%s", s)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "SELTimeUTCOffset=000") {
+		t.Fatalf("offset not zeroed:\n%s", s)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitize_PlainLogNoLeak_ByteIdentical(t *testing.T) {
+	in := []byte("just a boring log line\nnothing here\n")
+	res, err := Sanitize("x.log", in)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(res.Data, in) {
+		t.Fatalf("clean input was modified:\n%q", res.Data)
+	}
+	if res.TotalReplaced != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("changes on clean input: %+v", res.Changes)
+	}
+}
+
+func buildTar(t *testing.T, members map[string]string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
+	mt := time.Date(2026, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, time.UTC)
+	// deterministic order
+	for _, name := range []string{"onekeylog/clean.txt", "onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf"} {
+		body, ok := members[name]
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
+			Name: name, Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(body)), ModTime: mt, Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, Format: tar.FormatGNU,
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		tw.Write([]byte(body))
+	}
+	tw.Close()
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func tarList(t *testing.T, data []byte) map[string]tar.Header {
+	t.Helper()
+	m := map[string]tar.Header{}
+	tr := tar.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	for {
+		h, err := tr.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("re-read tar: %v", err)
+		}
+		body, _ := io.ReadAll(tr)
+		h.Size = int64(len(body))
+		m[h.Name] = *h
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+func TestSanitize_Tar_PreservesListingAndCleanMember(t *testing.T) {
+	members := map[string]string{
+		"onekeylog/clean.txt":                      "cpu model Xeon Gold\nmemory 512GB\n",
+		"onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf": leakLog,
+	}
+	in := buildTar(t, members)
+	res, err := Sanitize("dump.tar", in)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	before, after := tarList(t, in), tarList(t, res.Data)
+	if len(before) != len(after) {
+		t.Fatalf("member count changed: %d -> %d", len(before), len(after))
+	}
+	for name, hb := range before {
+		ha, ok := after[name]
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("member %s vanished", name)
+		}
+		if hb.Size != ha.Size || hb.Mode != ha.Mode || !hb.ModTime.Equal(ha.ModTime) || hb.Typeflag != ha.Typeflag {
+			t.Fatalf("member %s header changed: %+v -> %+v", name, hb, ha)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// clean member byte-identical
+	if memberBytes(t, res.Data, "onekeylog/clean.txt") != members["onekeylog/clean.txt"] {
+		t.Fatal("clean member was altered")
+	}
+	// leak member cleaned
+	scanClean(t, "resolv.conf", []byte(memberBytes(t, res.Data, "onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf")))
+	if res.TotalReplaced == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("nothing redacted")
+	}
+}
+
+func memberBytes(t *testing.T, tarData []byte, name string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	tr := tar.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(tarData))
+	for {
+		h, err := tr.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			t.Fatalf("member %s not found", name)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if h.Name == name {
+			b, _ := io.ReadAll(tr)
+			return string(b)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitize_TarGz_PreservesGzipHeaderAndInnerListing(t *testing.T) {
+	inner := buildTar(t, map[string]string{
+		"onekeylog/clean.txt":                      "board serial ABC123\n",
+		"onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf": leakLog,
+	})
+	var gz bytes.Buffer
+	gw, _ := gzip.NewWriterLevel(&gz, gzip.BestCompression)
+	gw.Name = "dump.tar"
+	gw.ModTime = time.Date(2026, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC)
+	gw.Write(inner)
+	gw.Close()
+
+	res, err := Sanitize("dump.tar.gz", gz.Bytes())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	gr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(res.Data))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if gr.Name != "dump.tar" || !gr.ModTime.Equal(time.Date(2026, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC)) {
+		t.Fatalf("gzip header not preserved: name=%q mtime=%v", gr.Name, gr.ModTime)
+	}
+	out, _ := io.ReadAll(gr)
+
+	before, after := tarList(t, inner), tarList(t, out)
+	for name, hb := range before {
+		if ha, ok := after[name]; !ok || !hb.ModTime.Equal(ha.ModTime) || hb.Size != ha.Size {
+			t.Fatalf("inner member %s changed", name)
+		}
+	}
+	scanClean(t, "inner-resolv", []byte(memberBytes(t, out, "onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf")))
+}
+
+func TestSanitize_Zip_UntouchedEntryIdentical(t *testing.T) {
+	var zb bytes.Buffer
+	zw := zip.NewWriter(&zb)
+	mod := time.Date(2025, 7, 8, 9, 10, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	for _, e := range []struct{ name, body string }{
+		{"clean.txt", "hardware inventory only\n"},
+		{"host/resolv.conf", leakLog},
+	} {
+		w, _ := zw.CreateHeader(&zip.FileHeader{Name: e.name, Method: zip.Deflate, Modified: mod})
+		w.Write([]byte(e.body))
+	}
+	zw.Close()
+
+	res, err := Sanitize("bundle.zip", zb.Bytes())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(res.Data), int64(len(res.Data)))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("output zip invalid: %v", err)
+	}
+	got := map[string]string{}
+	for _, f := range zr.File {
+		if !f.Modified.Equal(mod) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s Modified changed: %v", f.Name, f.Modified)
+		}
+		rc, _ := f.Open()
+		b, _ := io.ReadAll(rc)
+		rc.Close()
+		got[f.Name] = string(b)
+	}
+	if got["clean.txt"] != "hardware inventory only\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("clean entry altered: %q", got["clean.txt"])
+	}
+	scanClean(t, "zip-resolv", []byte(got["host/resolv.conf"]))
+}
+
+func TestSanitize_BinaryMemberFlagged(t *testing.T) {
+	fru := append([]byte{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, []byte("corp.acme.ru\x00padding")...)
+	in := func() []byte {
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		tw := tar.NewWriter(&buf)
+		tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Name: "onekeylog/FRU.bin", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(fru)), Typeflag: tar.TypeReg})
+		tw.Write(fru)
+		tw.Close()
+		return buf.Bytes()
+	}()
+
+	res, err := Sanitize("d.tar", in)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(res.SkippedBinary) != 1 || !strings.Contains(res.SkippedBinary[0], "FRU.bin") {
+		t.Fatalf("binary member not flagged: %+v", res.SkippedBinary)
+	}
+	if memberBytes(t, res.Data, "onekeylog/FRU.bin") != string(fru) {
+		t.Fatal("binary member was modified")
+	}
+}

internal/server/handlers.go

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import (
 	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/ingest"
 	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/models"
 	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/parser"
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/sanitize"
 	chartviewer "reanimator/chart/viewer"
 )
 
@@ -1273,7 +1274,15 @@ func (s *Server) handleGetPrivacyScan(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		jsonResponse(w, map[string]any{"loaded": false})
 		return
 	}
-	jsonResponse(w, result.PrivacyScan)
+	jsonResponse(w, struct {
+		*models.PrivacyScan
+		Sanitizable bool `json:"sanitizable"`
+	}{result.PrivacyScan, s.canSanitizeCurrent()})
+}
+
+func (s *Server) canSanitizeCurrent() bool {
+	pkg := s.GetRawExport()
+	return pkg != nil && pkg.Source.Kind == "file_bytes" && sanitize.CanSanitize(pkg.Source.Filename)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) handleGetStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -1721,6 +1730,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleClear(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	s.SetResult(nil)
 	s.SetDetectedVendor("")
 	s.SetRawExport(nil)
+	s.setSanitizeArtifact(nil)
 	for _, artifact := range s.clearAllConvertArtifacts() {
 		if strings.TrimSpace(artifact.Path) != "" {
 			_ = os.Remove(artifact.Path)

internal/server/sanitize_handlers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/sanitize"
+)
+
+// sanitizeArtifact holds the de-identified copy of the current upload, ready for
+// download. Kept in memory only, like convertOutput.
+type sanitizeArtifact struct {
+	Data     []byte
+	Filename string
+}
+
+func (s *Server) setSanitizeArtifact(a *sanitizeArtifact) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.sanitizeResult = a
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (s *Server) getSanitizeArtifact() *sanitizeArtifact {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	return s.sanitizeResult
+}
+
+// handleSanitize builds a de-identified copy of the retained original upload and
+// returns the change preview. The file itself is fetched from GET /api/sanitize/download.
+func (s *Server) handleSanitize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	pkg := s.GetRawExport()
+	if pkg == nil || pkg.Source.Kind != "file_bytes" {
+		jsonError(w, "sanitize is only available for an uploaded archive or log file", http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
+		return
+	}
+	if !sanitize.CanSanitize(pkg.Source.Filename) {
+		jsonError(w, "this file format cannot be sanitized in place", http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
+		return
+	}
+	data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(pkg.Source.Data)
+	if err != nil {
+		jsonError(w, "cannot read the original file bytes", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	res, err := sanitize.Sanitize(pkg.Source.Filename, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		jsonError(w, "sanitize failed: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.setSanitizeArtifact(&sanitizeArtifact{Data: res.Data, Filename: pkg.Source.Filename})
+
+	jsonResponse(w, map[string]any{
+		"filename":       filepath.Base(pkg.Source.Filename),
+		"input_size":     len(data),
+		"output_size":    len(res.Data),
+		"total_replaced": res.TotalReplaced,
+		"changes":        res.Changes,
+		"skipped_binary": res.SkippedBinary,
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleSanitizeDownload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	art := s.getSanitizeArtifact()
+	if art == nil {
+		jsonError(w, "no sanitized file ready; run POST /api/sanitize first", http.StatusNotFound)
+		return
+	}
+	// Always octet-stream so the browser saves rather than renders it.
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filepath.Base(art.Filename)))
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(art.Data)))
+	_, _ = w.Write(art.Data)
+}

internal/server/sanitize_handlers_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"archive/tar"
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.mchus.pro/mchus/logpile/internal/models"
+)
+
+func leakDumpBytes(t *testing.T) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var tarBuf bytes.Buffer
+	tw := tar.NewWriter(&tarBuf)
+	body := []byte("domain corp.acme.ru\nracdomain=corp.acme.ru\nTimeZone=Europe/Moscow\n")
+	tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{Name: "onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(body)), Typeflag: tar.TypeReg})
+	tw.Write(body)
+	tw.Close()
+	var gz bytes.Buffer
+	gw := gzip.NewWriter(&gz)
+	gw.Name = "dump.tar"
+	gw.Write(tarBuf.Bytes())
+	gw.Close()
+	return gz.Bytes()
+}
+
+func serverWithUpload(t *testing.T, filename string, data []byte) *Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	s := &Server{}
+	s.SetResult(&models.AnalysisResult{Filename: filename})
+	s.SetRawExport(&RawExportPackage{
+		Source: RawExportSource{
+			Kind:     "file_bytes",
+			Filename: filename,
+			MIMEType: "application/gzip",
+			Encoding: "base64",
+			Data:     base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(data),
+		},
+	})
+	return s
+}
+
+func TestHandleSanitize_PreviewAndDownload(t *testing.T) {
+	s := serverWithUpload(t, "dump.tar.gz", leakDumpBytes(t))
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSanitize(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/sanitize", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("preview status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body)
+	}
+	var preview struct {
+		TotalReplaced int `json:"total_replaced"`
+		Changes       []struct {
+			Category string `json:"category"`
+		} `json:"changes"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &preview); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if preview.TotalReplaced == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("nothing redacted")
+	}
+
+	dl := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSanitizeDownload(dl, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/sanitize/download", nil))
+	if dl.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("download status %d", dl.Code)
+	}
+	if cd := dl.Header().Get("Content-Disposition"); !strings.Contains(cd, `filename="dump.tar.gz"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("bad Content-Disposition: %q", cd)
+	}
+	gr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(dl.Body.Bytes()))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("output not gzip: %v", err)
+	}
+	inner, _ := io.ReadAll(gr)
+	tr := tar.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(inner))
+	h, err := tr.Next()
+	if err != nil || h.Name != "onekeylog/configuration/conf/resolv.conf" {
+		t.Fatalf("inner tar broken: %v %v", h, err)
+	}
+	clean, _ := io.ReadAll(tr)
+	if bytes.Contains(clean, []byte("acme.ru")) || bytes.Contains(clean, []byte("Europe/Moscow")) {
+		t.Fatalf("leak survived sanitize:\n%s", clean)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandleSanitize_RejectsNonFileSource(t *testing.T) {
+	s := &Server{}
+	s.SetResult(&models.AnalysisResult{})
+	s.SetRawExport(&RawExportPackage{Source: RawExportSource{Kind: "live_redfish"}})
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSanitize(rec, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/sanitize", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnprocessableEntity {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d, want 422", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandleSanitizeDownload_NotReady(t *testing.T) {
+	s := &Server{}
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSanitizeDownload(rec, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/sanitize/download", nil))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("status %d, want 404", rec.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/server/server.go

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	result         *models.AnalysisResult
 	detectedVendor string
 	rawExport      *RawExportPackage
+	sanitizeResult *sanitizeArtifact
 	convertJobs    map[string]struct{}
 	convertOutput  map[string]ConvertArtifact
 
@@ -89,6 +90,8 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() {
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/firmware", s.handleGetFirmware)
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/parse-errors", s.handleGetParseErrors)
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/privacy-scan", s.handleGetPrivacyScan)
+	s.mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/sanitize", s.handleSanitize)
+	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/sanitize/download", s.handleSanitizeDownload)
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/export/csv", s.handleExportCSV)
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/export/json", s.handleExportJSON)
 	s.mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/export/reanimator", s.handleExportReanimator)

web/static/css/style.css

@@ -1046,3 +1046,53 @@ code {
     font-size: 0.82em;
     color: var(--muted);
 }
+
+.privacy-sanitize {
+    padding: 10px 12px;
+    border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize.hidden,
+.privacy-sanitize-preview.hidden {
+    display: none;
+}
+
+#privacy-sanitize-btn,
+.privacy-sanitize-dl {
+    font-size: 0.85em;
+    padding: 5px 12px;
+    cursor: pointer;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-preview {
+    margin-top: 10px;
+    font-size: 0.88em;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-preview table {
+    margin: 6px 0;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-dl {
+    margin-top: 8px;
+    font-weight: 600;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-warn {
+    margin-top: 8px;
+    padding: 6px 8px;
+    background: #fff8f0;
+    border: 1px solid #f0e0c0;
+    border-radius: 4px;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-warn ul {
+    margin: 4px 0 0;
+    padding-left: 18px;
+    font-family: monospace;
+    font-size: 0.82em;
+}
+
+.privacy-sanitize-err {
+    color: var(--crit-fg);
+}

web/static/js/app.js

@@ -1497,9 +1497,57 @@ async function loadPrivacyScan() {
         if (findingsBox) findingsBox.style.display = privacyCollapsed ? 'none' : '';
     }
 
+    const sanBox = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize');
+    if (sanBox) {
+        sanBox.classList.toggle('hidden', !data.sanitizable);
+        const prev = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize-preview');
+        if (prev) { prev.classList.add('hidden'); prev.innerHTML = ''; }
+        const btn = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize-btn');
+        if (btn) { btn.disabled = false; btn.textContent = 'Обезличить и скачать копию'; }
+    }
+
     section.classList.remove('hidden');
 }
 
+async function sanitizePreview() {
+    const btn  = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize-btn');
+    const prev = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize-preview');
+    if (!btn || !prev) return;
+    btn.disabled = true;
+    btn.textContent = 'Обработка…';
+    let data;
+    try {
+        const resp = await fetch('/api/sanitize', { method: 'POST' });
+        data = await resp.json();
+        if (!resp.ok) throw new Error(data && data.error ? data.error : 'sanitize failed');
+    } catch (e) {
+        prev.innerHTML = `<div class="privacy-sanitize-err">${escapeHtml(String(e.message || e))}</div>`;
+        prev.classList.remove('hidden');
+        btn.disabled = false;
+        btn.textContent = 'Обезличить и скачать копию';
+        return;
+    }
+
+    const changes = Array.isArray(data.changes) ? data.changes : [];
+    const skipped = Array.isArray(data.skipped_binary) ? data.skipped_binary : [];
+    let html = `<p><strong>${data.total_replaced}</strong> замен в <strong>${changes.length}</strong> файл(ах). ` +
+        `Формат, имена и даты записей сохранены; правки той же длины.</p>`;
+    if (changes.length) {
+        html += '<table class="parse-errors-table"><thead><tr><th>Категория</th><th>Кол-во</th><th>Файл</th></tr></thead><tbody>' +
+            changes.map(c => `<tr><td>${escapeHtml(c.category)}</td><td>${c.count}</td><td>${escapeHtml(c.path)}</td></tr>`).join('') +
+            '</tbody></table>';
+    }
+    if (skipped.length) {
+        html += `<div class="privacy-sanitize-warn"><strong>Не удалось отредактировать (обезличьте вручную):</strong><ul>` +
+            skipped.map(s => `<li>${escapeHtml(s)}</li>`).join('') + '</ul></div>';
+    }
+    html += `<button type="button" class="privacy-sanitize-dl" onclick="window.location='/api/sanitize/download'">Скачать обезличенную копию</button>`;
+    prev.innerHTML = html;
+    prev.classList.remove('hidden');
+    btn.disabled = false;
+    btn.textContent = 'Пересобрать';
+}
+
 // The header + customer summary stay visible; only the findings table collapses.
 let privacyCollapsed = true;
 function togglePrivacy() {
@@ -1640,6 +1688,10 @@ async function clearData() {
         if (privacyFindings) privacyFindings.style.display = 'none';
         const privacyToggle = document.getElementById('privacy-toggle');
         if (privacyToggle) { privacyToggle.textContent = '▼'; privacyToggle.style.visibility = ''; }
+        const privacySan = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize');
+        if (privacySan) privacySan.classList.add('hidden');
+        const privacySanPrev = document.getElementById('privacy-sanitize-preview');
+        if (privacySanPrev) { privacySanPrev.innerHTML = ''; privacySanPrev.classList.add('hidden'); }
     } catch (err) {
         console.error('Failed to clear data:', err);
     }

web/templates/index.html

@@ -166,6 +166,10 @@
                 </div>
                 <div id="privacy-body" class="parse-errors-body">
                     <div id="privacy-customer" class="privacy-customer"></div>
+                    <div id="privacy-sanitize" class="privacy-sanitize hidden">
+                        <button id="privacy-sanitize-btn" type="button" onclick="sanitizePreview()">Обезличить и скачать копию</button>
+                        <div id="privacy-sanitize-preview" class="privacy-sanitize-preview hidden"></div>
+                    </div>
                     <div id="privacy-findings" class="privacy-findings" style="display:none">
                         <table class="parse-errors-table">
                             <thead>