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+# Contract: Release Signing
+
+Version: 1.0
+
+## Purpose
+
+Ed25519 asymmetric signing for Go release binaries.
+Guarantees that a binary accepted by a running application was produced by a trusted developer.
+Applies to any Go binary that is distributed or supports self-update.
+
+---
+
+## Key Management
+
+Public keys are stored in the centralized keys repository: `git.mchus.pro/mchus/keys`
+
+```
+keys/
+  developers/
+    <name>.pub    ← raw Ed25519 public key, base64-encoded, one line per developer
+  scripts/
+    keygen.sh         ← generates keypair
+    sign-release.sh   ← signs a binary
+    verify-signature.sh ← verifies locally
+```
+
+Public keys are safe to commit. Private keys stay on each developer's machine — never committed, never shared.
+
+**Adding a developer:** add their `.pub` file → commit → rebuild affected releases.
+**Removing a developer:** delete their `.pub` file → commit → rebuild releases.
+Previously signed binaries with their key remain valid (already distributed), but they cannot sign new releases.
+
+---
+
+## Multi-Key Trust Model
+
+A binary is accepted if its signature verifies against **any** of the embedded trusted public keys.
+This mirrors the SSH `authorized_keys` model.
+
+- One developer signs a release with their private key → produces one `.sig` file.
+- The binary trusts all active developers — any of them can make a valid release.
+- Signature format: raw 64-byte Ed25519 signature (not PEM, not armored).
+
+---
+
+## Embedding Keys at Build Time
+
+Public keys are injected via `-ldflags` at release build time — not hardcoded at compile time.
+This allows adding/removing developers without changing application source code.
+
+```go
+// internal/updater/trust.go
+
+// trustedKeysRaw is injected at build time via -ldflags.
+// Format: base64(key1):base64(key2):...
+// Empty string = dev build, updates disabled.
+var trustedKeysRaw string
+
+func trustedKeys() ([]ed25519.PublicKey, error) {
+    if trustedKeysRaw == "" {
+        return nil, fmt.Errorf("dev build: trusted keys not embedded, updates disabled")
+    }
+    var keys []ed25519.PublicKey
+    for _, enc := range strings.Split(trustedKeysRaw, ":") {
+        b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(enc))
+        if err != nil || len(b) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+            return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid trusted key: %w", err)
+        }
+        keys = append(keys, ed25519.PublicKey(b))
+    }
+    return keys, nil
+}
+```
+
+Release build script injects all current developer keys:
+
+```sh
+# scripts/build-release.sh
+KEYS=$(paste -sd: /path/to/keys/developers/*.pub)
+go build \
+  -ldflags "-s -w -X <module>/internal/updater.trustedKeysRaw=${KEYS}" \
+  -o dist/<binary>-linux-amd64 \
+  ./cmd/<binary>
+```
+
+Dev build (no `-ldflags` injection): `trustedKeysRaw` is empty → updates disabled, binary works normally.
+
+---
+
+## Signature Verification (stdlib only, no external tools)
+
+Use `crypto/ed25519` from Go standard library. No third-party dependencies.
+
+```go
+// internal/updater/trust.go
+
+func verifySignature(binaryPath, sigPath string) error {
+    keys, err := trustedKeys()
+    if err != nil {
+        return err // dev build or misconfiguration
+    }
+    data, err := os.ReadFile(binaryPath)
+    if err != nil {
+        return fmt.Errorf("read binary: %w", err)
+    }
+    sig, err := os.ReadFile(sigPath)
+    if err != nil {
+        return fmt.Errorf("read signature: %w", err)
+    }
+    for _, key := range keys {
+        if ed25519.Verify(key, data, sig) {
+            return nil // any trusted key accepts → pass
+        }
+    }
+    return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed: no trusted key matched")
+}
+```
+
+Rejection behavior: log as WARNING, continue with current binary. Never crash, never block operation.
+
+---
+
+## Release Asset Convention
+
+Every release must attach two files to the Gitea release:
+
+```
+<binary>-linux-amd64        ← the binary
+<binary>-linux-amd64.sig    ← raw 64-byte Ed25519 signature
+```
+
+Signing:
+
+```sh
+sh keys/scripts/sign-release.sh <developer-name> dist/<binary>-linux-amd64
+```
+
+Both files are uploaded to the Gitea release as downloadable assets.
+
+---
+
+## Rules
+
+- Never hardcode public keys as string literals in source code — always use ldflags injection.
+- Never commit private keys (`.key` files) anywhere.
+- A binary built without ldflags injection must work normally — it just cannot perform verified updates.
+- Signature verification failure must be a silent logged warning, not a crash or user-visible error.
+- Use `crypto/ed25519` (stdlib) only — no external signing libraries.
+- `.sig` file contains raw 64 bytes (not base64, not PEM). Produced by `openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin`.